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Abstract: Discussing the contemporary debate about the metaphysics of relations and structural
realism,  I  analyse the  philosophical  significance  of  relational  quantum  mechanics  (RQM).
Relativising  properties  of objects  (or systems)  to other  objects  (or  systems),  RQM affirms that
reality is inherently relational. My claim is that RQM can be seen as an instantiation of the ontology
of ontic structural realism, for which relations are prior to objects, since it provides good reasons for
the argument from the primacy of relation. In order to provide some evidence, RQM is interpreted
focusing on its metametaphysics, in particular in relation to the very concept of relation, and to the
meaning such concept assumes in the dispute between realism and antirealism.
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The reality of relations
This way of thinking the world has certainly heavy philosophical implications.
The claim of the relational interpretations
is that it is nature itself that is forcing us to this way of thinking.
If we want to understand nature,
our task is not to frame nature into our philosophical prejudices,
but rather to learn how to adjust our philosophical prejudices
to what we learn from nature.
Carlo Rovelli e Federico Laudisa
1. INTRODUCTION
In the history of Western philosophy, several philosophers have argued for the ontological status
of relations, whilst others have criticised the notion of "thing", from Heraclitus to the contemporary
metaphysics  of  relations,  passing  through  Nietzsche  (critique  of  the  thing-in-itself),  Whitehead
(process-relational philosophy), Heidegger (the mit-sein), Nancy (l’etre avec), Putnam (there are no
individuals except in a relative sense), just to name a few from different traditions. In the meantime,
the systems theory has claimed that «what we call a part is merely a pattern in an inseparable web
of relationships. Therefore, the shift of perspective from the parts to the whole can also be seen as a
shift from objects to relationships»1. As the referenced authors have underlined, this approach is
recognisable in many fields, not only in the natural sciences but in the social  sciences as well,
especially in relation to the French Structuralism of the sixties.
Rarely, however, has a close relation between the ontological status of relations and the criticism
about the notion of objects as substances been established in philosophy, that is, by demonstrating
the metaphysics of relations decomposing objects in structural terms2. Structural realism is one of
the approaches that has embraced this goal, specifically in its ontic dimension developed by James
Ladyman, arguing for the preeminence of relations over substances, as self-subsistent individual
objects, and acquiring scientific evidence from quantum mechanics3. Ontic structural realism (OSR)
posits relations, and not objects, as fundamental.
The aim of this paper is to discuss relational quantum mechanics (RQM) within this framework,
explaining its philosophical significance as naturalised metaphysics. By "naturalised metaphysics",
I mean those philosophical models of the fundamental nature of reality based on contemporary
science, specifically with current fundamental physics. My claim is that RQM may be seen as an
instantiation of the ontology of structural realism, as OSR, affirming the reality of relations prior to
objects. In  order  to  provide  some  evidence,  I  will  interpret  RQM  by  focusing  on  its
metametaphysics,4 in  particular,  in  relation  to  the  concept  of  relation  and  to  the  meaning  this
1 F.Capra - P. L. Luisi, The Systems View of Life, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2014, p. 80.
2 See J. Stachel,  Structure, individuality and quantum gravity, in D. Rickles, S. French, J. T. Saatsi (eds.),  Structural
Foundations of Quantum Gravity, Clarendon Press, Oxford 2006, pp. 53-82, for a useful categorisation of different
types of metaphysics of relations. In particular, for our topic, I would underline the importance of the first and third
types, focusing respectively on relations without relata and on the priority of relations over relata.
3  J.  Ladyman,  Structural  Realism,  in  E.  N.  Zalta  (ed.),   Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy,  2014,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/structural-realism/ Cited 1 March 2017. 
4 I am not the first to aim for this goal, see: M. Bitbol, Physical Relations or Functional Relations? A non-metaphysical
construal  of  Rovelli's  Relational  Quantum  Mechanics,  in «Philosophy of  Science  Archive» (2007),  http://philsci-
archive.pitt.edu/3506/ Cited 1 March 2017; M. Brown, Relational Quantum Mechanics and the Determinacy Problem,
in «British Journal for the Philosophy of Science» 60/4 (2009), pp. 679-695; M. Dorato, Rovelli's Relational Quantum
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concept  assumes  in  the  dispute  between  realism and antirealism.  My goal  is  to  understand  its
significance  for  the  philosophical  debate  in  metaphysics  rather  than  discussing  its  consistency.
However, in doing so, I will derive a positive outcome for OSR as well, providing a clear point of
reference  for  its  argument  from  the  primacy  of  relations.  Since  structural  realism  derives  its
argument from quantum mechanism, a relational account in quantum mechanics is helpful for it.
In order to point out the significance of RQM for the contemporary debate about the metaphysics
of relations – and to properly understand what "relation" may mean here – I will introduce some
philosophical notions that are extrinsic to the theory but that possess a strong explanatory power for
the metaphysics implicitly embedded in the model. In Section 2, I will sketch some of the core traits
of the theory, defending its realistic stance. Comparison of RQM with the elements characterising
antirealism in Sections 3 and 4 is done to clearly determine its realist philosophical configuration,
which is commendable within the framework of structural realism. Then, in Section 5, I will deeply
analyse the notion of relation, the central concept of the theory, claiming that we need to argue for
its ontic valence; and I will reply to some objections to my thesis about RQM as OSR.
2. THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONFIGURATION OF RQM
RQM is a relational theory of quantum mechanics developed by the physicist Rovelli5. It asserts
the nonexistence of a perspective-independent description of the universe, stressing the relational
nature of quantum systems, criticising the instrument-independent state of a system or observer-
independent values of physical quantities.
There are several formulations of quantum mechanics that attempt to build an image consistent
with the data provided by the discoveries of scientists like Planck, Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg and
Dirac. I decided to focus on Rovelli’s RQM because it is very challenging for the contemporary
debates in the metaphysics of relations and realism.6 It is easy to see how this approach is related to
the issue of realism – here, intended in a broad sense and not only as scientific realism – which
represents  a  much-debated  present  topic  after  a  period  characterised  by  the  prevalence  of
antirealism,  especially  in  Continental  philosophy.  In  fact,  realist  approaches  argue  –
notwithstanding the differences among the various perspectives – that there are building blocks of
the world, and that these are what they are independent of our conceptualisation. If we address
RQM from the point of view of realism, we will find that relations are the building blocks of reality
and that they are information. According to RQM, information is observer-independent.
Emphasising  the  relationship  between  measurement  and  observed,  RQM  questions  the
relationship between epistemology and ontology in the foundation of a naturalised metaphysics. In
fact, RQM proposes an ontology that relativises properties or states of objects (or systems) to other
objects (or systems). Since different observers  give different descriptions of the state of the same
system, the notion of state is observer-dependent. Consequently, RQM argues against the notion of
"object" as an "entity" that possesses intrinsic properties, relativising properties or states of objects
Mechanics, Anti-Monism, and Quantum Becoming, in A. Marmodoro - D. Yates (eds.),  The metaphysics of relations,
Oxford University Press, Oxford 2016, pp. 235-261; B. van Fraassen, Rovelli's World, «Foundations of Physics» 40/4
(2010), pp. 390-417.
 
5 C. Rovelli, Relational quantum mechanics, «International Journal of Theoretical Physics» 66 (1996), pp. 1637-1678.
6 There are other relational approaches besides Rovelli’s theory, as Gyula Bene’s  "Quantum reference systems" and
Simon  Kochen’s  "Sigma  algebra  of  interactive  properties",  or  interpretations  close  to  them,  for  example  modal
interpretations. The starting point of relational theories can be traced back to Everett's relative-state interpretation . See:
G. Bene, Quantum reference systems: a new framework for quantum mechanics, «Physica» A242 (1997), pp. 529-560;
S. Kochen,  The interpretation of quantum mechanics,  «Princeton University Preprint» (1979); H. Everett,  Relative
State' Formulation of Quantum Mechanics, «Reviews of Modern Physics» 29 (1957), pp. 454-462.
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(or systems) to other objects (or systems).
The notion of an  absolute observer-independent state of a system is replaced by the notion of
information  about  a  system,  exchanged  via  physical  interactions.  Relations  are  modalities  of
processes, structures through which the systems interact and communicate. The structure of reality
is not made of connections among objects, but of interrelated relations. Rovelli, referring to the
American philosopher Nelson Goodman, argues that quantum mechanics describes those events that
are  interactions  between  processes.  By  "processes",  Rovelli  means  those  transitions  from  an
interaction to another7 that constitute reality as a series of events, and not of objects.
Since  RQM understands  correlations  as  information,  the  dynamic  nature  of  the  processes  is
strictly connected with the second postulate of quantum mechanics – as reconstructed by Rovelli8
for which it is always possible to acquire new information about a system – about the unlimited
information.  From  a  philosophical  perspective,  this  postulate  underlines  the  procedurality  of
knowledge and, in the meantime, embraces the empiricist account for which new and "a posteriori"
discoveries should always challenge prior knowledge.9 Nevertheless, taking into account the first
postulate, for which there is a maximum amount of relevant information that can be extracted from
a system, we can grasp the idea that this process is discrete, since there is a limited amount of
information. These two postulates do not contradict each other, as it may seem, since they claim that
there is a fixed amount of relevant procedurally-acquired information. Thanks to the first postulate,
we can give a complete, discrete and coherent description of a system; thanks to the second, the
opportunity to modify it, gaining an epistemic success.10
Van Fraassen11 has understood RQM within the framework of informational structural realism12.
In  fact,  Rovelli  has  explicitly  argued  for  a  reformulation  of  quantum  mechanics  in  terms  of
information theory13, claiming that RQM describes only the information that systems have about
each  other.  Van  Fraassen  has  pointed  out  that  RQM  «offers  a  program to  derive  the  theory’s
formalism  from  a  set  of  simple  postulates  pertaining  to  information  processing»14.  In  the
relationship between system X and system Y, X acquires information from Y. In this specific sense,
the states are "observer’s information". Therefore, the wave function describes the information that
the observer has on the system.
Van  Fraassen’s  interpretation  makes  RQM  more  compatible,  as  shown  in  Section  3,  with
epistemic  structural  realism (ESR),  instead  of  OSR as  I  suggest.  Unless  ESR may seem more
7 «Spacial and temporal specifications make sense only on the boundary of a process, in the context of an interaction. In
other words, space and time themselves are reduced to quantum entities like the position of a quantum particle, which is
determined only at interaction time, otherwise is fluctuating»,  C. Rovelli (ed.), General Relativity. The Most Beautiful
of Theories. Applications and Trends after 100 years, Berlin/Munich/Boston, De Gruyter 2015, p. 234.
8 One of the aim of RQM is, in fact, to reconstruct the formalism of quantum mechanics without the notion of state of
system. See: C. Rovelli, Relational quantum mechanics, cit..
9 «Quantum mechanics is the theoretical formalization of the experimental discovery that the descriptions that different
observers  give  of  the  same  ensemble  of  events  are  not  universal»,  C.  Rovelli,  Halfway  Through  the  Woods:
Contemporary Research on Space and Time, in J. Earman - J. D. Norton (eds.),  The Cosmos of Science: Essays of
Exploration, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh 1996, pp. 180-223, p. 206.
10 RQM posits a third postulate too, the one about the superposition principle in terms of information theory, i.e., the set
of questions. I do not consider it here because it does not have anything to do with my argument.
11 B. van Fraassen, Rovelli's World, cit.
12 L. Floridi, Information. A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010.
13  Rovelli  refers  to  the  technical  sense  of  information-theory  in  C.  E.  Shannon,  The  mathematical  theory  of
communication,  University of Illinois Press, Chicago 1949, for which the amount of information is the number of the
elements of a set of alternatives out of which a configuration is chosen.  
14  B. van Fraassen, Rovelli's World, cit., p. 390.
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reasonable for  depicting RQM, specifically for  its  observer-dependent  characterisation,  I  would
stress the ontological valence of RQM and, thus, explain why relations as information should be
understood as the building blocks of the universe and frame it within OSR.
My claim is that RQM is a realistic theory that assumes the notion of relation as primitive15; or
more specifically, the physical interaction between systems and instruments as primitive. As I will
explain in Section 5, OSR will posit structures as primitives, from which objects will emerge as
relational "nodes"16, or intersections of the relevant relations17. Those nodes emerge from the web of
relations, not the opposite,  as for the standard view about relations as relata linkings, and their
identity will derive by their function in the structure.
Dorato  has  specifically  criticised  RQM  on  this  point,  arguing  that  a  theory  that  refers  to  a
primitive  notion  deals  with  explanatory  poverty  and  that  it  asks  us  «to  accept  it  as  a  brute
metaphysical  fact  about  the  world»18.  However,  to  be  an  ontological  primitive  indicates  an
axiomatic – rather than unprovable – concept, in this case.  In my opinion, moreover, OSR could
provide to RQM the justification for understanding structures not only as representational tools but
also in its constitutive role as well. Thus, my method consists in comparing RQM with the elements
characterising antirealism in order to determine more clearly its realist philosophical configuration,
which is compatible with OSR as I claimed.
3. DOES RQM DEAL WITH RELATIVISM?
RQM may seem to be a relativist theory. In fact, RQM theorises the impossibility of an absolute
image of reality (no absolute states, no intrinsic properties19) in the name of the net that emerges
from the relations among systems. What appears to  the observer  A can be different  from what
appears to the observer B20. Thus, RQM seems to be consistent with the definition of "relativism"
provided by the SEP:
«[...] “relativism” covers views which maintain that – at a high level of abstraction – at least some class of
things have the properties they have (e.g., beautiful, morally good, epistemically justified) not simpliciter, but
only relative  to a given framework of  assessment  (e.g.,  local  cultural  norms,  individual  standards),  and
correspondingly, that the truth of claims attributing these properties holds only once the relevant framework
of assessment is specified or supplied. Relativists characteristically insist, furthermore, that if something is
only  relatively  so, then there can be no framework-independent vantage point from which the matter of
15 Recognising structures as primitives, Mertz has provided an ontology of structure with the aim of explaining how it is
possible to conceive of relations without assuming prior relata. See: D. W. Mertz, An Instance Ontology for Structures:
Their Definition, Identity, and Indiscernibility, «Metaphysica» 4 (2003), pp. 127–64. 
16 S. French, Structure as a Weapon of the Realist, «Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society» 106 (2006), pp.167–185, p.
173.
17 French has developed his account through the notion of powers and, thus, understanding the relevant relations as
causation. I cannot develop this topic here, but I would mention that Laudisa has envisaged developing RQM in this
way too. This is meaningful because it  makes clear another affinity between RQM and OSR. See:  F.  Laudisa,  La
causalità  in  fisica,  in  V.  Allori,  M.  Dorato,  F.  Laudisa,  N.  Zanghì  (eds.),  La  natura  delle  cose.  Introduzione  ai
fondamenti e alla filosofia della fisica, Carocci, Roma 2005, pp. 395-428.
18 M. Dorato, Rovelli's Relational Quantum Mechanics, Anti-Monism, and Quantum Becoming, cit., p. 245.
19  «The notion rejected here is the notion of absolute, ore observer-independent, state of a system; equivalently, the
notion of state-independent values of physical quantities», C. Rovelli, Relational quantum mechanics, cit.
20 The observer should be intended as the system, in Galilean terms, from which it is possible to deduce information
concerning the event x. Brown has called it "metasystem", i.e., another physical system capable of interacting with the
system in such a way as to gain information about the property in question. See:  M. Brown,  Relational Quantum
Mechanics and the Determinacy Problem, cit.
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whether the thing in question is so can be established».21 
The  Relativistic Schema says that  Y is relative to  X and thus there are not absolutes. Until this
point,  RQM  seems  consistent  with  this  definition.  Nevertheless,  it  is  exactly  through  the
consequences that it draws from such definitions that the incompatibility with RQM appears clear.
In particular, the value-indifference and the impossibility of formulating theories, or expressing true
judgments about the nature of the things, do not belong to RQM which, on the contrary, aims at a
complete description of reality22.
RQM is not a relativistic theory, but a relational one, that is, relationism. If relativism indicates the
inescapable relationship that determines the knowledge of reality, consisting in the duality between
the  observer  and  the  observed;  relationism is  rather  characterised  by  an  objectivist  emphasis,
indicating  the  relational  structure  that  constitutes  two  or  more  realities  that  do  not  exist
independently.  Thus,  relationism  is  a  philosophical  position,  affirming  that  relations  exist  as
ontological  primitives.  In  the  history  of  Western  philosophy,  the  name  "relationism"  has  been
referred  to  Leibniz’s  conception  of  space  and  time  –  a  conception  opposed  to  Newton’s
substantivism.23 The Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, a cornerstone of Leibniz’s philosophy,
ensures the individuality of objects, understood as "bundles" of properties; as Steven French and
Décio Krause have pointed out, this definition of an object has relevant implications for all theories
that place mathematical structures at the roots of reality24. Nevertheless, the relationism of RQM is
different from the one of Leibniz, since it claims that the space and time in which the relations will
manifest themselves are indeterminate, furthering Heisenberg’s insight. And so for OSR, as we will
see in Section 5.
4. DOES RQM DEAL WITH ANTIREALISM?
«The  declared  objective  of  scientific  research  is  not  to  provide  some  correct  predictions,  but  to
‘understand’ how the world works. What does this mean? It means to build and develop an image of the
world, that is to say a conceptual framework for thinking about the world, effective and consistent with what
we know and learn about it».25  
RQM implies a critique of the notion of object. The objects denied by the RQM are the objects’
things which characterise naive realism; denying their existence does not imply that there is nothing
or that nothing is real. The challenge is to think reality in relational terms, engendering thus a new
way of understanding "objects" and of imagining forms of connection that are different from the
institution of links between objects.
Frequently, although there are philosophers that have argued against it26, relativism is analysed
21  M.  Baghramian  -  A.  Carter,  Relativism,  in  E.  N.  Zalta  (ed.),  Stanford  Encyclopedia  of  Philosophy, 2015.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/relativism/ Cited 1 March 2017.
22 Often relativism is associated with the theme of points of view, from its founder Protagoras ( «man is the measure of
all  things»)  to  19th century  Continental  philosophy,  especially  Foucault’s  perspectivism and  a  large  part  of  post-
Nietzschean philosophy.
23  M.  Futch,  Leibniz’s Metaphysics of Time and Space,  Springer,  New York 2008.  Rovelli underlines the historical
passage  from  substantivalism  to  relationalism  in  the  understanding  of  the  notion  of  spacetime.  See:  C.  Rovelli,
Quantum Gravity, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2004, pp. 54-55.
24  S.  French, D. Krause,  Identity in Physics: A Formal, Historical  and Philosophical Approach,  Oxford University
Press,  Oxford 2006, pp. 8-11.
25  C.  Rovelli,  Che cos'è  la  scienza? La rivoluzione  di  Anassimandro.  Mondadori,  Milano  2011,  pp.  122-123,  my
translation.
26 C. Rovane, La separazione del relativismo dall'antirealismo, in M. De Caro - M. Ferraris (eds.), Bentornata realtà. Il
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together with its antirealist facet. RQM partakes with antirealism the claim for which there are no
framework-independent facts of certain sorts. Nevertheless, RQM denies that there is no real object
that corresponds to what we perceive/think, or that nothing exists outside the mind, and, even if it
existed, we would not have access to it.
The relationship between RQM and the realism/antirealism debate seems to be characterised by a
certain grade of ambivalence: in some respects RQM is closer to the antirealist thesis,27 saying that
there are no absolute states but, as for the realism in others, stressing that what we measure as
relations  exists.  Therefore,  I  think  it  could  be  fruitful  to  make  RQM  more  coherent  from  a
philosophical point of view, framing it within OSR.
Michel Bitbol has proposed to interpret RQM as a neo-Kantian theory, replacing the physical (or
naturalised) properties with the functional reference frames. Bitbol therefore proposes to understand
the relativity of RQM in functional and non-substantial terms28. Although Bitbol’s proposal is very
challenging, it misses the purely ontological plane of RMQ.29 In fact, Bitbol criticises Rovelli for a
remnant of substantialism which, on the contrary, should be emphasised, not for reestablishing the
self-subsistent individual objects but for recognising the ontological status of relations.
The reason is that RQM cannot be reduced to a theory that takes the theory of knowledge as its
ontology, whereas it refers to an observer-dependent pattern. RQM describes the structure of matter:
the interaction between systems is  a primitive notion and information is exchanged via physical
interactions. The reason is that there are no intrinsic properties that can be assigned to systems
independently  of  their  information-gathering  interactions. Therefore,  RQM  cannot  be  regarded
within the pattern of ESR, for which what the scientific theories explain are the structures through
which we know the world, but not its nature. ESR does not undertake any ontological commitment.
For ESR, the nature could be constituted by individual objects prior to relational structure and,
therefore, relations should represent only the ways in which the objects are known by a system. But
this is not what the philosophical configuration of RQM would attain, since, in my understanding,
its main goal is to demolish, from an ontological point of view, the notion of intrinsic properties of
objects, replacing it with the notion of correlation as information, from an ontological point of view.
«[...] the physical structure of the world is identified as this net of relationships»30.
5. THINKING RELATIONS RELATIONALLY
RQM, in agreement with Mermin’s analysis on the statistical features of correlation 31, makes use
of  the  "no  go"  theorems,  according  to  which  relations  emerge  without  having  to  leave  or  get
anywhere as a matter of necessity, and are not intended as lines connecting two points, thus as
connections  between (pre-)existing  objects32.  Thus,  for  the  "Ithaca  interpretation  of  QM",  only
nuovo realismo in discussione, Einaudi, Torino 2012, pp. 65-87.
27 Rovelli has highlighted the negative influence of antirealism over the development of science: «Scientific antirealism,
in my opinion, is not only a shortsighted application of a classical empiricist insight; it is also a negative influence over 
the development of science», C. Rovelli, Quantum Gravity, cit., p. 309.
28 M. Bitbol, Physical Relations or Functional Relations?, cit.
29 Bitbol’s intepretation may lead to the Kantian ESR, and not to OSR. About Kantian ESR, see M. Massimi, Structural 
Realism: a neo-Kantian perspective, in A. Bokulich & P. Bokulich (eds.), Scientific Structuralism, Springer, Dordrecth 
2011, pp. 1-24. 
30 C. Rovelli, F., Laudisa,  Relational Quantum Mechanics, in E. N. Zalta (Ed.),  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
2008, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-relational/ Cited 1 March 2017.
31 D. Mermin, What is quantum mechanics trying to tell us?,  «American Journal of Physics», 35 (1998), pp. 753-767.
32According to  Dorato,  RQM differs from the Ithaca interpretation of QM as it  interprets the quantum systems as
endowed with a probabilistic disposition to reveal certain definite values of physical magnitudes by interacting with any
kind of physical system. On the contrary, the first principle of the Ithaca interpretation of QM claims for the objective
reality independent of observers and their knowledge. My position here is that RQM can attain an objective account of
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correlations are real and relata are not.  It is true that for RQM, as for the Ithaca interpretation of
QM, «There are no things that can enter into a relation, but it is the relation that gives rise to the
notion  of  “things”»33,  but  relations  should  be  understood  as  real  structures. As  I  claim,  OSR
provides a coherent philosophical frameworks34 that can explain the metaphysical implications of
RQM. Abandoning the dogma of the existence of absolute states, objects and properties should not
be interpreted in deceptive35 terms, but as the maximal expression of the relatedness of the real,
intending  with  "relation"  something  other  than  a  connection  between  objects:  the  interactions
between processes as structures.
Traditionally – starting from Aristotle’s categories, which were taken up in the medieval debate
about the concept of relation – relation is intended as a property of an object, that is, supervenient
on the intrinsic nature of the objects related. Instead, the image of the world proposed by RQM
invites  us  to  think  of  reality  not  as  starting  from things,  which  would  be  then  connected  by
relationships, but as processes that manifest  "things" as the result  of their  intertwining.  Even if
RQM is not based on a clear metaphysical assumption, it provides a description of reality that poses
relations as real and prior to objects. Therefore, this view requires a metaphysics able to explain
how it is possible to conceive structures prior to objects, without contradictions. My claim is that
this metaphysics is the one drawn by OSR.
Ladyman,  Ross  and French’s  account  of OSR aims to provide an answer to the necessity of
developing an ontology of structure, that is, the mathematical content of the theory, compatible with
physics36. As recognised by Ladyman and Ross, the roots of this "naturalised metaphysics" can be
found in the work of John Worrall37, who, in turn, recognised his debts to Poincaré38. For them, what
exists are "real patterns" to be understood as mathematical models or modal structures. Ladyman
and Ross has declared their willingness to take seriously the thesis for which the world is made of
structures and relations39. For the authors, this thesis is positive and it is motivated by contemporary
science that asks for the abandonment of a metaphysics of self-subsistent individuals. The main
argument for scientific realism – OSR is among it – is expressed by the no-miracles argument: the
efficacy of contemporary science is a proof that its prediction refers to an external reality, unless we
explain its success as a miracle. The authors have claimed that «structural realism is supposed to be
reality without denying the observer-dependent feature and, thus, recognising as its objects the relations themselves.
See: M. Dorato, Rovelli's Relational Quantum Mechanics, Anti-Monism, and Quantum Becoming, cit.
33  C. Rovelli,  La realtà non è come ci appare. La struttura elementare delle cose,  Raffaello Cortina Editore,  Milano
2014,  p. 118, my translation.
34 This does not mean that OSR has not been an object of criticism. In fact, the alleged incoherence of OSR is a major
theme in the literature, specifically through the objection that we cannot have relations without relata. For a resume of
the  debate  see  S.  Briceño  -  S.  Mumford,  Relations  All  the  Way  Down? Against  Ontic  Structural  Realism,  in  A.
Marmodoro, D. Yates (eds.),  The metaphysics of relations, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2016, pp. 198-217. For a
critical examination of the thesis defended by its "founder" John Worrall, cf. S. Psillos,  Is Structural Realism the Best of
Both Worlds?,  «Dialectica» 49 (1995), pp. 15-46. For one of the first reply to the criticism by the very proponents of
OSR, cf. S. French - J. Ladyman, Remodelling Structural Realism: Quantum Physics and the Metaphysics of Structure,
«Synthese» 136 (2003), pp. 31–56. See also S. French, J. Ladyman,  In Defence of Ontic Structural Realism, in A.
Bokulich & P. Bokulich (eds.),  Scientific Structuralism, Springer, Dordrecth 2011, pp. 25-42.
35  Even if Rovelli himself uses deceptive terms at times:  «The world of existent things is reduced to the world of
possible relations. Reality is reduced to interaction. Reality is reduced to relation», C. Rovelli,  La realtà non è come ci
appare, cit., p. 118, my translation.
36 J. Ladyman, What is Structural Realism?, in «Studies in History and Philosophy of Science» 29 (1998), pp. 409–424.
37 J. Worrall, Structural realism: The best of both worlds?, in «Dialectica» 43 (1989), pp. 99-124.
38 J. Ladyman - D. Ross, Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007, pp.
93-95. 
39 Ibi, p. 153.
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realist enough to take account of the no-miracles argument»40.
Ladyman and Ross argue for a ontic – not only epistemic – structuralism:
«[…] there are mind-independent modal relations between phenomena (both possible and actual), but these
relations are not supervenient on the properties of unobservable objects and the external relations between
them. Rather this structure is ontologically basic».41
Therefore,  the identity of objects  depends on the relational  structure of the world.  Identity is
structure-relative,  and something  could  not  be  the  thing  it  is  unless  it  is  located  in  a  field  of
relations.  The  main  argument  for  OSR  brought  by  Ladyman  and  French42 is  that  postulating
substantial objects as the building blocks of reality leads to a metaphysical underdetermination in
the  interpretation  of  quantum mechanics.  This  means  that  quantum particles  do  not  obey  the
Leibnizian Principle of the Identity of the Indiscernibles and, thus, they do not possess individual
identities43.This implies that there are no absolute discernibles. Thus, the argument says that a realist
account  should  provide  a  different  metaphysical  approach,  compatible  with  the  discovery  of
quantum mechanics, and OSR is exactly supposed to attain this goal, arguing for the impossibility
of individuation and positing relations as fundamental. Moreover, the argument claims that OSR is
the  only account  able  to  preserve  realism against  the  decomposition  of  objects  highlighted  by
quantum mechanics, since it assumes relations as fundamentals, and not substances. Doing so, OSR
appears to be a reconceptualisation of ontology pushed by the discoveries of science.
The OSR’s argumentative strategy is therefore to derive the primacy of relations as structures
through the criticism of the notion of substances, supported by the evidence provided by quantum
mechanics about physical indiscernibles. Quantum mechanics and OSR are strongly entangled in
this argument: not only OSR depends from quantum mechanics regarding the evidence, but the
reasons provided by OSR enhance the explanatory power of quantum mechanics. Regarding my
argument: not only OSR may provides the right philosophical framework to understand the image
of the world proposed by RQM, but also RQM seems to be the more compatible theory with OSR,
since the two are grounded on the relationality of reality. As it has been clarified by Morganti44, the
argument from the primacy of relations is the more recent argument for OSR, and it constitutes its
positive  claim.  For  example,  Muller  has  underlined  that  understanding  quantum  particles  as
relationals reinforces OSR45. Therefore, not only RQM will benefit to be framed within OSR, but
the latter as well may be supported by RQM.
40 Ibi, p. 128.
41 Ibidem.
42 J. Ladyman, What is Structural Realism?, in «Studies in History and Philosophy of Science» 29 (1998), pp. 409–424;
S. French - J. Ladyman, Remodelling Structural Realism, cit.
43  Chakravartty has  addressed  the  issue  regarding  the  features  of  everyday objects  and  the  "objects"  of  quantum
mechanics. Since for OSR the underdetermination pertains to the unobservable objects of quantum mechanics only, then
Chakravartty has asked why we should dismiss the notion of individuality, if it fits properly for the everyday observable
objects. See A. Chakravartty, A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable. Cambridge University
Press,  Cambridge 2007, pp. 70-75.  Consequently,  as  it  has been already made clear in one of his previous works
dedicated to ESR and OSR the author will recognise the value of thinking reality relationally, but it will not accept to
state  that  reality is  relations  only,  as  for  OSR.  See  A.  Chakravartty,  The  Structuralist  Conception of  Objects,  in
«Philosophy of Science» 70 (2003), pp. 867–78. 
44  M.  Morganti,  Is There a Compelling Argument for Ontic Structural Realism? ,  in  «Philosophy of Science» 78/5
(2011), pp. 1165-1176.
45 F. A. Muller, Whithering Away, Weakly, in «Synthese» 180 (2011), pp. 223–33, 231.
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Dorato46 has claimed that RQM does not take the whole as an ultimate conceptual horizon, and
thus it differs not only from systems theories, but also from monism, even in terms of "priority
monism"47. This point could be considered as an objection to my claim for which RQM should be
framed in OSR, since for the structuralist the whole is prior to the parts. It is the structure what
defines not only the identity, but also the existence of the "things". This question has to do with the
very debated issue, also among the different structuralist approaches, of ontological dependency and
syncronic conception of mereology48. I cannot go into it here in detail but let me introduce a very
specific answer regarding RQM. By way of introduction, I may say that Rovelli’s theory concerning
the granularity of matter  is  not  directed at  the definition of the whole but,  on the contrary,  to
quantum particles. It asks to "think small" and not to "think big". For Ladyman49, the principle of
individuation  may  involve  relations  and  not  intrinsic  properties.  Thus,  for  the  model  of  OSR
proposed by Ladyman, the parts are "in virtue of" relation50. It is the relation, as structure, which is
prior, since objects are defined in virtue of their relational individuation. In the meantime, I agree
with Dorato regarding the fact that the image of the reality portrayed by RQM differs from the
whole  of  the  systems  theories.  Relationships  are  not  already determined,  but  RQM permits  to
predict the probability of their appearance. But this is not in contrast with the core thesis for which
the things are ontological dependent on the relations. OSR, in fact, is not the same as ontological
holism and thus it is,  at least about the nature of the granularity of matter, not passable of this
objection.
Another objection to my thesis to frame RQM within OSR may arise from the central role played
by the notion of information within RQM and, therefore, asking to frame it within an epistemic
account, not a metaphysical one, as I have already introduced. This objection is grounded on two
core thesis of RQM: (1) that correlation has no absolute meaning, since it is the information that a
third system can acquire about the coupled system-observer; (2) that the properties of the systems
are  to  be  described  by  an  interrelated  net  of  observations  and  information  collected  from
observations. The objection moves from the idea that the metaphysical level and the epistemic one
are disjointed. Nevertheless, as I have already explained discussing the two postulates in Section 2,
the two planes dwell together and information should be understood as physical interaction. What
the  observer  states  is  the  ontology  of  RQM.  I  can  concede  to  the  objection  that  what  RQM
understands as ontology derives from a very special kind of objects – relations as information – but
this does not mean that these objects are not to be framed within the ontic level as OSR well does.
Thus information, being a net or correlation, should be understood as a structure that for OSR has a
metaphysical value.
7. CONCLUSION
Arguably,  the  metaphysical  implications  of  RQM  I  attempted  to  highlight  in  this  paper
demonstrate  the  extreme  philosophical  wealth  of  RQM  as  OSR.  More  work  should  be  done,
especially in fully drawing the metaphysical stance of such a relational theory. Nevertheless, I think
that  the thesis  I  introduced here may be meaningful  by itself,  not only to fully understand the
philosophical vision of the world that derives from RQM but also to provide some evidence for this
metaphysics  that  understood  relations  as  the  very  building  blocks  of  the  reality.  After  having
depicted the philosophical configuration of the theory in Section 2, I addressed the relativist and
46 M. Dorato, Rovelli's Relational Quantum Mechanics, Anti-Monism, and Quantum Becoming, cit.
47 J. Schaffer, Monism: The Priority of the Whole,  in «Philosophical Review» 119/1 (2010), pp. 31-76.
48 J. Ladyman, The Foundations of Structuralism and the Metaphysics of Relations, in A. Marmodoro - D. Yates (eds.),
The metaphysics of relations, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2016, pp. 177-197.
49 Ibi, p. 183.
50 Ibi, p. 182.
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antirealist challenges to the theory to argue for its realistic stance. Its realism has appeared to be the
one that recognises reality to relations as structures and, thus, in Section 5, I depicted RQM as OSR.
Doing so, I discovered that not only RQM would benefit from this operation but also OSR as well,
since  RQM could  provide  some  reasons  for  the  argument  from the  primacy of  relations.  The
efficacy of my proposal has been highlighted in the end replying to two main objections, one about
ontological dependency and the other about the supposed incompatibility between ESR and OSR.
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